A Brief Comment on Motivation and
Impact

MICHAEL PERRY*

This comment focuses on two distinct problems: the relevance
of motivation and the significance of disproportionate racial impact.
THE RELEVANCE OF MOTIVATION

Professor Ely's groundbreaking article' presented the first comprehensive theory of the relevance of legislative and administrative motivation to constitutional adjudication. Ely's theory is
flawed, largely for the reasons given by Professor Brest in his perceptive article. 2 No subsequent commentary has significantly improved on Brest's theory of the relevance of motivation, a theory
in part recently endorsed by the Supreme Court.3 In this brief
comment, I aim not to add anything novel to the already ample
and sometimes confusing and confused discussion of motivation. I
hope to state as precisely and as simply as possible, and thereby
to clarify, why and to which sorts of constitutional claims motiva* Visiting Associate Professor of Law (1978-1979), Yale Law School; Assistant
Professor of Law, Ohio State University. A.B., Georgetown University, 1968; J.D.,
Columbia University, 1973.
1. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).

2. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problemof Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95. Others have endorsed Brest's critique.
See, e.g., L. TRME, AmsEcAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 596 n.12 (1978).
3. Compare Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429

U.S. 252 (1977), with Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
UnconstitutionalLegislativeMotive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95.
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tion is relevant. Because of space constraints, I must be telegraphic.
In order to be constitutional, every law 4 must satisfy two basic

conditions: First, the law must be an exercise of a delegated (in
the case of the national government) or a reserved (in the case of
a state government) power; second, the law must resolve competing interests in a manner that respects the priority these interests
have under the Constitution.5 With respect to the second condition, one should note that every law represents a complex normative judgment-a decision that a certain interest (or interests)
ought to be served; a decision that the interest ought to be served
in a particular way, that is, by means of the law in question; and a
decision to accept whatever cost of disserving (abridging) a competing interest (or interests) the law entails. In general terms, the
second condition of constitutionality requires that the interest(s)
the legislature intended the law to serve (governmental interest),
factored by the extent to which the law actually serves this interest,6 be weightier than the interest(s) the law disserves (private
interest), factored by the extent to which the law disserves this
interest. Obviously, a court cannot determine whether a law satisfies the second basic condition of constitutionality unless the
court knows what interest the legislature intended the law to
serve. After all-and this is crucial-at issue is the constitutionality of the complex normative judgment the lawmaker actually
reached, not the constitutionality of some judicially "conceivable"
normative judgment the lawmaker did not reach. What counts, in
short, is not some normative judgment that could but does not underlie the law, but rather the normative judgment that in fact underlies the law.7 Therefore, legislative intent is indisputably
relevant to constitutional adjudication-specifically, to adjudication of claims that a law fails the second condition.
4. I am concerned in this comment with legislative intent, not the intent underlying a particular adjudication. CompareVillage of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-

tan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (discussion of relevance of legislative
intent), with Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281-87 (1977)
(discussion of relevance of intent underlying particular adjudication). Of course,
courts and administrative bodies legislate as well as adjudicate-indeed, they legislate as they adjudicate-and where a judicial or an administrative body legislates (explicitly or implicitly) a particular rule, the rule entails a particular
"legislative" intent.
5. "Constitution" denotes more than the written Constitution: Not all constitutionally protected interests are referrable to the constitutional text. See, e.g.,
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
6. And with reference to the possibility of alternative ways of serving the interest.
7. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). But see text accompanying note 12 infra.
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Of course, if the private interest the law disserves is one the

lawmaker is under an absolute duty not to abridge, no inquiry
into legislative intent is necessary: The law is unconstitutional
whatever the governmental interest and whatever the extent to
which it serves that interest. 8 In this sense, a law can be unconstitutional because of its effect-that is, because it has the effect of
abridging a particular private interest-without regard to legislative intent. More frequently, however-specifically, where the
private interest the law disserves is constitutionally "fundamental"--the lawmaker's duty is presumptive, not absolute: It is a
duty not to abridge without sufficient reason. With respect to laws
having the effect of abridging such interests, an inquiry into legislative intent is necessary: Because the law is unconstitutional if
the interest the legislature intended the law to serve is not "compelling" (or "important"), 9 the court needs to know what this interest is.
Legislative intent is relevant to adjudication of two distinct
sorts of constitutional claims. First, a claim that X is the governmental interest and that X is illegitimate necessitates an inquiry
whether X is in fact the interest the legislature intended the law
to serve. Actually, the claim would be that X is one interestwhether or not the only one-the law was intended to serve, that
X is illegitimate, and that the legislature would not have enacted
the law but for its decision that X ought to be served.O Second, a
claim that X is the governmental interest and that X is legitimate
but that the law does not serve X to any or to an adequate extent
8. One might say that an absolute duty not to abridge a particular interest

means that a law abridging that interest is not an exercise of a delegated or reserved constitutional power and thus fails the first basic condition of constitutionality.
9. Or if the law fails to serve a compelling interest to a "substantial" extent, or
if there exists a "less restrictive" way of serving that interest to virtually the same
extent.
10. The defender of the law bears the burden of proving that the desire to serve
the illegitimate interest was not a but for cause of the law. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977); Comment, Proofof Racially DiscriminatoryIntent Under the Equal Protection Clause:
Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburg, 12 HA~v.

C.R.-C.L L REV. 725, 752-55 (1977) (comparing the Supreme Court's approach to
the problem of proof of discriminatory intent in Arlington Heights with that of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. School
Dist. (Omaha I), 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975), reaffd
per curiam, 541 F.2d 708 (en bane) (Omaha II), vacated per curiam, 433 U.S. 667,
reaff'd per curiam, 565 F.2d 127 (1977) (en bane) (Omaha III)). See note 22 infra.
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necessitates an inquiry whether X is the interest the legislature
intended the law to serve." Of course, as a practical, institutional
matter, a court's incentive to pause to inquire whether X is in fact
the interest the legislature intended the law to serve is considerably diminished where the abridged private interest is not deemed
particularly weighty, and the law serves (is rationally related to)
some legitimate interest.' 2 Commentators on motivation have
paid little if any attention to the relevance of legislative intent to
adjudication of the second sort of claim.13 The Supreme Court,
however, recently emphasized the importance of intent with respect to such claims.14
The state action/inaction issue discussed by Professor Clark'5
can be simplified in the following terms. Certain interests are not
legitimate objects of governmental pursuit. Disadvantaging a person because she possesses African ancestry or because she engages in political dissent is such an interest. Where government
affirmatively imposes a burden on persons engaging in political
dissent in order to discourage or to punish their dissent, government's action is unconstitutional. 6 Where government grants a
11. No law is enacted for "no reason": Every deliberate act, including every law,

is by definition undertaken for a (or many) reason(s). Thus, one can say that
every law was intended to serve some interest(s) and that the interest is either
legitimate or illegitimate. If the interest is illegitimate, the law is unconstitutional;
if the interest is legitimate, the law either serves the interest, or it does not. If it
does not serve the interest, the law is unconstitutional: The government's side of
the balance-the governmental interest factored by the extent to which the law
serves that interest-is zero. Therefore, to say that a law is "arbitrary" in the sense
of serving (rationally relating to) no governmental interest is necessarily to say
one of three things: (1) The law serves no legitimate governmental interest-that
is, it serves only an illegitimate interest; (2) the law does not serve the legitimate
governmental interest(s) the legislature intended it to serve; or (3) it is impossible
to ascertain which interest among several possible interests the legislature intended the law to serve and thus impossible to say whether the law serves
whatever interest(s) the legislature intended it to serve.
12. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
13. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Clark, Legislative Motivation
and FundamentalRights in ConstitutionalLaw, 15 SAN DiEGo L REV. 953 (1978);
Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L REV. 36, 146-49 (1977); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). However, in his
treatise Professor Tribe addresses the issue of the relevance of legislative intent to
adjudication of the second sort of constitutional claim. See L. TRBmE, AmRICAN
CoNsTrrTroNA, LAw 1085-88 (1978).
14. Compare Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), with Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313 (1977). See L. TABE, A mRICAN CONsTrruoNAL LAW 1085-88; text accompanying note 7 supra.
15. Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional
Law, 15 SAN DiEGo L REV. 953, 1011-24 (1978).

16. Where government, in an effort to serve some legitimate interest (that is,
not in order to discourage or to punish dissent), affirmatively imposes a burden on
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benefit to persons with a certain need in order to relieve that
need, but for purposes of discouraging or of punishing dissent
withholds the benefit from persons who, but for their involvement
in political dissent, would receive the benefit, government's inaction -in the form of witholding the benefit is unconstitutional.17
For example, while government may give economic subsidies to
needy newspapers in rural communities, government may not simultaneously withhold such subsidies from needy newspapers refusing to sign an agreement not to carry editorials critical of
government. Therefore, legislative intent is relevant to adjudication of claims respecting state "inaction" in the form of withholding benefits otherwise granted: Whether such a policy is
constitutional depends on whether the withholding is intended to
serve a legitimate interest.' 8
The real issue with respect to legislative intent, as the Supreme
Court now recognizes,19 is not whether legislative intent is relevant, but how it can be ascertained, especially where a lawmaker
is a collection of persons and the law, although ostensibly (on its
face) serving a legitimate interest, is claimed to have been intended to serve an illegitimate one. The difficulties of ascertaining
intent, however, are not impregnable, and the Court, following the
commentators, 20 already has begun to develop the necessary evipersons engaging in political dissent, its action (if constitutional at all) must satisfy the "strict scrutiny" test of constitutionality. See note 9 and accompanying
text supra.
17. If the withholding is an effort to serve a legitimate interest, government's action is presumptively unconstitutional and thus subject to strict scrutiny. See note
16 supra.
18. See Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases:A Comment on the Supreme Court's
Role in American Government, 66 GEO. L.J., 1191, 1193, 1201 (1978) (arguing that
benefit-withholding policy sustained in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), was unconstitutional because it intended to discourage constitutionally protected activity
(abortion)).
Assume that a legislature declines to establish a benefit program at all solely in
order to avoid (for example) benefitting blacks. Although a legislator declining to
act solely (or even principally) for this reason violates his oath of loyalty to the
Constitution, and although in theory such state inaction is unconstitutional, as a
practical matter a court cannot be expected to require the legislature to establish
the benefit program: Frequently, selective (discriminatory) inaction in the form of
benefit withholding cannot be adequately explained by constitutionally legitimate
reasons, but legislators almost always will have given good reasons in explanation
of not acting at alL
19. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977).
20. The Court has especially relied upon Brest. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson:
An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalMotive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95.
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dentiary rules (presumptions and burdens of proof and of going
forward).21 Such rules, like evidentiary rules in other contexts,
must be fashioned with sensitivity to both the realities of litiga22
tion and the substantive (constitutional) principles at stake.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISPROPORTIONATE RACIAL IMPACT

I have discussed the issue of disproportionate racial impact
(DRI) elsewhere. 23 Against the background of that discussion, I
would like to comment on Professor Eisenberg's recent admirable
essay, The Role of Impact.24
My ultimate conclusion with respect to the significance of DRI
is that any law having a DEl ought to be subject to an unusually
heavy burden of justification-which is not to say that it ought to
be struck down-for the simple reason that the disproportionate
character of the impact is not ethically neutral but is a function of
21. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-68, 270 n.21 (1977).
22. Sketched below are three basic evidentiary approaches to the problem of ascertaining illicit motivation.
First, if "plaintiff" (the party challenging the state action) can establish that the
challenged action (law) is not facially neutral but instead entails a constitutionally
suspect distinction, government must show that the interest(s) the legislature intended the law to serve is compelling, that the law substantially serves the interest(s), and that no less restrictive law vll serve as well.
Second, if the challenged law is facially neutral, plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that a desire to serve an illicit interest was a cause of the law ("a motivating factor"), whereupon the burden shifts to the government to establish that the
desire was not a but for cause. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Query: should not government be required to
establish in this regard that the licit interest(s) the legislature allegedly intended
the law to serve is weighty and that the law substantially serves the interest?
Third, if plaintiff can establish that the challenged law, although facially neutral,
has a foreseeable disproportionate racial impact, government bears the burden of
showing that a desire to serve a racially discriminatory interest was not a cause or,
if a cause, not a but for cause of the law. See Comment, Proofof Racially Discriminatory Intent Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington
Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburg, 12 HAzv. C.R.-C.L. L REv. 725, 752-55
(1977) (discussing the "Omaha presumption").
Note that with respect to proof of racially discriminatory motivation, this third
approach would largely displace the Arlington Heights approach: Virtually every
facially neutral law a plaintiff would challenge as racially motivated would have a
foreseeable disproportionate racial impact. But see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217 (1971). Query: Because under the Omaha presumption plaintiff does not bear
the difficult burden of showing that racially discriminatory motive was a cause,
but rather, government bears the burden of showing that the presumed illicit motive was not a but for cause, is not the Omaha presumption preferable to the Arlington Heights approach? But see text accompanying note 27 infra. See note 38
infra.
23. Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination,125 U.
PA. L REv. 540 (1977).

24. Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 42-99. This article comprises two distinct discussions, The Role of Impact, id., and The Role of Motive, id., at 99-168.
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prior massive societal discrimination against blacks. A lawmaker
ought to be required to explain his reasons for taking action exacerbating the already severely disadvantaged position of blacks in
American society. In short, a black person's interest in not being
disadvantaged in a way that is largely and ultimately a consequence of prior societal discrimination is more weighty than, for
example, an optician's interest in duplicating lenses without a
prescription.2 5 A law having a DRI should be deemed constitutional only if the governmental interest(s), factored by the extent
to which the law serves (and with reference to the possibility of
alternate ways of serving) this interest, is weightier than the
black person's interests factored by the extent to which the law
abridges the interests. The interests of the black person include
not only the general interest specified above but also the particular interest at stake (for example, a job, housing in a racially balanced community, or a seat in a racially balanced school).
Pursuant to Eisenberg's "causation principle," 26 a particular
instance of DRI is constitutionally significant-that is, the particular instance triggers an unusually heavy burden of justification-if and only iL
(1) The DRI would not exist or would be less drastic but for
intentional racial discrimination, either (a) by government, prior
to the governmental act having the DRI that is the subject of challenge, or (b) by a private actor or actors, subsequent to the governmental act challenged; and
(2) Either the prior governmental discrimination or the subsequent private discrimination is the "proximate cause" of the DRI.
Condition (1) (a) seems either ill-advised or largely superfluous.
If Eisenberg means to require that a black plaintiff prove the
specific acts of prior governmental discrimination that are a but
for cause of the particular DRI about which she is complaining,
then why should the plaintiff be subjected to the onerous burden-onerous in terms not only of time and expense but also of
difficulty of proof and so of possibility of failure--of establishing
according to rules of evidence that which may be difficult to prove
specifically but can fairly be assumed generally? If Eisenberg
does not mean to require that the plaintiff establish specific acts,
then the condition is largely unnecessary. As Eisenberg himself
25. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
26. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 57-83.
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notes, "[g]iven the tragic history of relations between the races in
this country, nearly all current uneven impact may ultimately be
traceable to prior official discrimination." 27
Condition (1) (b) seems anomalous in a theory of the significance of DRI. In illustrating this condition, Eisenberg uses the example of government giving a scarce resource, a liquor license, to
a private club that refuses to serve blacks. However, in such a situation, where the subsequent private discrimination clearly has a
direct racial impact, rather than the governmental action (the licensing), impact is not the issue. The issue is whether and to
what extent government should be deemed a complicitor (or even
an active partner) in the private discrimination. 28 It is puzzling
why this "state action" issue-which of course is an extremely
important issue-should be discussed or conceptualized in terms
of a theory of the significance of DRI.
Eisenberg means to serve two policies by specifying condition
(2): first, "the need to 'draw the line somewhere so that liability
will not crush those on whom it is put' ",;29 second, "the need 'to
work out rules which are feasible to administer, and yield a workable degree of certainty.' "30 Consider the second policy first: As a
matter simply of feasibility and of workability, obviously a proximate cause condition is less desirable than no proximate cause
condition because the condition necessitates difficult line-drawing
respecting matters of degree, intervening causes, and the like.
Now, consider the first policy-the need to draw the line somewhere so that liability will not crush those on whom it is put: On
whom would liability be put? The governmental agency (or some
responsible principal) whose action is challenged? However,
whether in terms of the burden to the agency the challenged action should be sustained or overturned is the sort of issue that
should be resolved at the "balancing" stage, after the court has
27. Id., at 54. Eisenberg writes:
There are limits on how far a court should go, as a matter of constitutional
law, in compelling government officials to justify uneven im]pact simply

because it is traceable to official discrimination at some earlier point in
time. At some point, the connection to prior discrimination is too remote

for courts to act.
Id., at 55. The meaning of "too remote" is unclear. Perhaps, on the one hand, the
relationship between massive, pervasive prior discrimination against blacks, and
on the other hand, the greater poverty, poorer academic attainment, and residential isolation among blacks today is neither easily quantified nor calibrated.
However, the relationship is anything but remote: It is profound.
28. Eisenberg states: "[In private racial discrimination cases] uneven impact is
usually apparent. The more likely issue in [such] cases is whether there is a suffi-

cient connection between the challenged state action and the private race-dependent decision." Id., at 67.
29. Id., at 59 (quoting James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 784 (1951)).
30. Id. (quoting James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 784 (1951)).

1180

[voL. 15: 1173, 1978]

Motivation and Impact
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

determined that the requisite showing has triggered an unusually
heavy burden of justification. Eisenberg recognizes that once this
burden of justification has been triggered, the court must balance

the competing interests. 3 1 Whether "liability" in a particular case

will be sufficiently "crushing" that on balance it ought not to be

imposed is an issue appropriately considered at the stage of a
32
case where a court is weighing competing interests.

31. E.g., id., at 72.
32. Would liability be put on anyone besides the challenged governmental
agency? Eisenberg indicates that it would: "In a society of finite resources and opportunities, the avoidance of uneven impact resulting from past discrimination
often will impose substantial costs on innocent third parties. Increased minority
representation in professional schools, for example, may come at the expense of
qualified white students." Id., at 60.
Eisenberg seems to confuse affirmative action theory with DRI theory. The latter theory, unlike the former, does not call for the allocation of scarce goods and
resources specifically to racial minorities with the consequence that these scarce
goods and resources are denied specifically to at least some non-minority persons.
DRI theory requires only that government, in certain contexts, not needlessly rely
on laws or practices disadvantaging the poor or the poorly educated (a disproportionate number of whom are black) or on laws or practices reinforcing racial isolation. (A poor or poorly educated white person benefits from the absence of laws
disadvantaging poor or poorly educated persons no less than a poor or poorly educated black.) DRI theory, unlike affirmative action theory, would require (to use
Eisenberg's example) only that criteria for admission to professional school, if the
criteria have a DRI, be substantially related to academic or to professional potential and to ability to (best) succeed in school or in the profession, and that there
be no less burdensome criteria or methods of admission serving the same goals.
See Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination,125 U.
PA. L. REV. 540, 561, 568 n.131 (1977).
Finally, Eisenberg takes issue with an argument of mine. Compare Perry, id. at
566-71, with Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 97 n.286. For the reader interested in evaluating this dispute, the following clarification might prove useful. In Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court rejected the notion that DRI is constitutionally significant (except insofar as it evidences illicit intent) in part because the Court feared that if accepted, the theory would require an upheaval in
constitutional doctrine respecting inter alia jury selection and legislative districting.
The Court's fears in this regard are unnecessary and largely a function of the
Court's failure to understand the state of existing constitutional doctrine governing jury selection and legislative districting. First, the Court's sixth amendment
doctrine already establishes a disproportionate impact test with respect to jury
selection. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). Second, there is no occasion for application of a disproportionate impact test with respect to racial discrimination in legislative districting because the Court has indicated that where a
particular multi-member districting scheme operates to disadvantage blacks but
not other political minorities-that is, where a particular multi-member scheme
has been serving as the vehicle of the electorate's racial prejudices-the multimember scheme can be disestablished on the motivational (not impact) ground
that the scheme is infected with discriminatory intent. See White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755, 765-66, 767 (1973). Although Eisenberg reads White to authorize an impact
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Finally, Professor Simon has written a thoughtful analysis, 33
but I am inclined to disagree with him to this extent: A law having
a DRI, or a law granting preferential treatment to a racial minority, ought to be subject to an unusually heavy burden of justification even if it is incontestable that the law was not motivated by
any racialprejudice whatsoever.34 I have discussed the first sort
of law-laws having a DRI-above. The second sort of law encourages thinking in racial terms, and thinking in racial terms is the
soil on which racial prejudice grows;35 moreover, where scarce resources (for example, seats in a medical school class) are at
stake, preferential treatment is a source of racial resentment, itself a substantial cause of racial prejudice, and can generate feelings on the part of both the favored minority and the majority
that the minority is somehow inferior. Government ought not to
be permitted to resort to either sort of law unless it can establish
that the interest(s) the law is intended to serve, factored by the
extent to which the law serves the interest (and, of course, with
reference to the possibility of alternate ways of serving the interest), is weighty enough to justify the costs of the law-in short,
that the game is worth the candle.
The difference between this position and Simon's may be at
least somewhat semantic: Simon seems to suggest that a law having a DRI and which cannot be explained as substantially related
to, or necessary to the effectuation of, the governmental interest
should be deemed enacted or at least maintained because of racial prejudice. 36 However, there is a sense in which more than semantics is at stake: In the present context, the function of
imposing a heavier than usual burden of justification ought not to
be understood as solely to flush out whatever racial prejudice
test and not to require proof of illicit intent, the Court's reference in Washington v.
Davis to its legislative districting cases amply supports the proposition that in districting cases the Court requires a showing of illicit intent and that impact per se
(as opposed to impact as evidence of intent) is not significant. See Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). White, read against the background of Washington,

indicates that a showing that the challenged multi-member district serves as the
vehicle of the electorate's racial animus can establish the requisite intent.
33. Simon, Racially PrejudicedGovernmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of
the ConstitutionalBan Against Racial Discrimination,15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041
(1978).

34. But see id. at 1110.
35.

See Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equalityfor the Negro-

The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363, 379-80 (1966).
36. E.g., Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation The.
ory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination,15 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1041, 1126-27 (1978). The difference becomes even more a matter of semantics
if one deems legislative inattention to the immediate or ultimate costs a law visits
on the minority persons affected by it a form of racial prejudice. See L. TArE,
AmawcAN CoNsTrrorroNAL LAw 1032 (1978).
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might have motivated a law; 37 there is another and perhaps more
basic function that imposition of a heavier burden would serve-a
function that should be served-namely, to assure that laws with

certain costs (specifically laws having a DRI and laws granting
preferential treatment) are justified by sufficiently weighty considerations. After all, the second basic condition of constitutionality requires that the interest(s) a law was intended to serve,

appropriately factored, be weightier than the interest(s) the law
disserves, factored by the extent to which the law disserves that

interest.8

37. E.g., Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the ConstitutionalBan Against Racial Discrimination,15 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1041, 1070-71, 1076 (1978).
38. Note that under DRI theory, see Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory
of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977), a party challenging a
facially neutral law having a disproportionate racial impact need not allege racially discriminatory motive and, moreover, probably would gain no tactical advantage in doing so. The showing required of government under DRI theory, if made,
would in effect establish that which government would have to establish under Arlington Heights or the Omaha presumption, see note 22 supra: that a racially discriminatory motive was not a but for cause of the law. To this extent, adoption of
DRI theory would render moot the second and third approaches to the problem of
ascertaining racially discriminatory motivation, discussed in note 22 supra. Finally, note that adoption of (a) the Omaha presumption along with (b) the requirement that government, in order to prove that racially discriminatory motive
was not a but for cause, establish that the licit interest(s) the legislature allegedly
intended the law to serve are weighty and that the law is substantially related to
the interest, would, for all practical purposes, be tantamount to adoption of DRI
theory.

1183

